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Abstract
This paper elaborates an axiomatic treatment of the Subjective Expected Util-
ity (seu) model that dispenses with the assumption of an exogenous state space.
Within a state-free description of uncertainty and alternatives, axioms for prefer-
ences are formulated and shown to characterize the existence of a subjective state
space, a subjective probability and a utility function. In the representation, the in-
dividual appears to behave as if he used the state space to describe uncertainty and
maximized seu to make decisions. Moreover, the state space, probability and utility
are unique in some appropriate sense.
Keywords: expected utility, subjective state space, causality, consequentialism
JEL classification: D81, D90
1 Introduction
In his axiomatic treatment of Subjective Expected Utility (seu), Savage (1954) defines
a state of the world as a description of the world leaving no relevant aspect undescribed.
Though the set of states is subjective in the sense of depending upon the individual and
representing the prior information available to him in the decision process, it is not derived
from preferences and is in fact exogenously given. Subjectivity and exogeneity create
some difficulties in applications of the theory. In a normative perspective, it is not clear
whether the use of a state space is in itself part of the seu recommendation and the Savage
theory might remain of little help to individuals unwilling or unable to describe uncertainty
through a state space.
What this paper calls into question is the ability of individuals to combine relevant aspects
into well-defined states of the world. Think for instance of a portfolio manager and two
assets whose future prices either go up or down. The manager still has to deal with the
possible causal relationships between prices. If he believes that prices are causally inde-
pendent, then his subjective state space should include the four states (up, up), (up, down),
∗Paris School of Economics-Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne: vassili.vergopoulos@univ-paris1.fr.
I would like to thank Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Michel Grabisch and Jean-Marc Tallon for their
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(down, up) and (down, down). If he rather believes that whenever the price of the first as-
set goes up, the price of the second asset also does, then he should remove state (up, down)
from this state space. Finally, if he also believes in the reciprocal, he should further re-
move state (down, up). Thus, the assumption of an exogenous state space presupposes a
very clear understanding of causal relationships between relevant aspects that is perhaps
unrealistic in sufficiently complex decision situations.
The individual’s understanding of causality should also be correct. Even slight mistakes
in the specification of states might indeed have undesirable effects. In the example, if
the correct state space only contains (up, up), (down, up) and (down, down) and yet the
manager also includes impossible state (up, down) in his subjective state space, he will
sometimes choose dominated actions: a share of asset 1 is dominated at each state by a
share of asset 2 and yet, by symmetry, the inclusion of the impossible state makes the
manager indifferent between the two alternatives. In contrast, if the correct state space
includes all four possible states and yet the manager omits possible state (up, down), he
will believe unduly that asset 2 dominates asset 1, systematically prefer buying shares of
the former and thus be led to choose underdiversified portfolios.
How exactly to acquire such a clear and correct understanding of causality? Assume that,
for each relevant aspect, the individual knows a feasible experiment that always determines
the way the uncertainty attached to this relevant aspect resolves. As long as the number of
relevant aspects is finite, it is possible to perform all of these experiments at once and thus
to observe directly the state that actually obtains. Repetitions of the latter compound
experiment then provide at least a rough idea of the way causality works and, therefore, of
the appropriate state space to use. If, after a sufficiently large number of repetitions, the
manager never observes the configuration where the first price goes up while the second one
goes down, he can legitimately start to believe that state (up, down) is in fact impossible.
But consider now complex decision situations where an infinity of relevant aspects exists. A
state has to encode the resolution of uncertainty for infinitely many relevant aspects while,
due to feasibility constraints, experiments can only measure the resolution of uncertainty
for a finite number of them. It becomes impossible to observe empirically the actual state.
In the example, even the daily observation of a finite number of prices cannot provide
enough information to help the manager construct a state space when there is an infinity
of assets. As a result, there appears to be an irreducible amount of arbitrariness in the
choice of any specific state space and individuals might be reluctant to make their decisions
on the basis of speculation about things they ignore and simply cannot observe.
This paper improves the axiomatic treatment of seu by dispensing with this problematic
assumption of an exogenous state space. More precisely, it elaborates a state-free descrip-
tion of uncertainty and alternatives (Section 2.1 ) and focuses on what is here called a
Savage representation of preference (Section 2.2 ). Such a representation entails a subjec-
tive state space, a subjective probability and a utility function. In the representation, the
individual behaves as if he used the subjective state space to formalize uncertainty and
causality, and maximized seu over that state space to make decisions. Behavioral axioms
on preference are then formulated that consist not only of straightforward reformulations of
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the Savage ones but also of additional ones of a more logical and epistemic nature (Section
3.1 ). These axioms are shown to characterize the existence of a Savage representation and
the state space, probability and utility are shown to be unique in some appropriate sense
(Section 3.2 ). Finally, while the state space and the precise form of causality it captures
are exogenous in Savage’s seu, they are here determined endogenously from behavior as a
part of the representation of preference.
A key aspect of the paper is that preference is restricted to feasible acts. Intuitively, an
alternative (or an act in the Savage terminology) is said to be feasible if it is always possible
to perform experiments that determine the consequence it actually induces. The restriction
of preference to feasible acts ends up providing a much compelling justification for the
axioms that characterize Savage representations: what makes these axioms so compelling
is precisely the fact that preference is, by definition, restricted to feasible acts. In the logic
of the paper, a rational individual having to make choices between feasible acts is therefore
expected to conform to these axioms and finally maximize seu over some subjective state
space. Thus, the use of a state space is justified upon axioms of rationality and becomes
explicitly part of the seu normative recommendation.
One may still worry about the possibility of dealing with causality upon a radically dif-
ferent mode. After all, the individual can always use the grand state space made of all
theoretically conceivable states, redefine acts as distributions of consequences across states
in the Savage fashion and formulate probability judgments on this grand state space. Thus,
causality would be reduced to probabilistic correlation and would not require a new model
as the one developed here. However, this would do nothing but move the problem on: if
the individual is unable to say whether a given state is possible, it is hard to imagine that
he can assign it a specific probability. Moreover, this approach would rely implicitly upon
the assumption consequentialism. The latter says that any two acts that induce the same
distribution of consequences across states should be indifferent. In the words of Savage, if
two different acts had the same consequences in every state of the world, there would from
the present point of view be no point in considering them two different acts at all. While
certainly compelling at a first glance, consequentialism remains difficult to justify without
a more precise definition of states of the world. In contrast, the present construction en-
dogenizes, not only the state space, but also consequentialism with respect to that state
space and thus provides an axiomatic justification of this assumption.
In its turn, consequentialism entails the existence of Savage preferences (preferences over
the subjective state space). By construction, the latter necessarily conform to Savage’s
Sure Thing Principle (stp) as soon as they exist. It is indeed the same axiom that ends
up implying all three of consequentialism, Savage preferences and their compliance with
stp. This aspect of the construction is consistent with Hammond’s (1988) consequentialist
foundations of seu and defense of stp. While Hammond formalizes his argument in
the context of dynamic choice, the same intuition is here reformulated in a purely static
framework and leads to the following conclusion: if preferences over a subjective state
space are allowed to depart from stp, then it is not clear why they exist in the first
place. This challenges the ambiguity literature which typically takes preferences as given
and yet weakens stp to account for the distinction between risk and uncertainty in the
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sense of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961). However, the negative conclusion on the
possibility of ambiguity over the subjective state space only holds for behavior subject to
feasibility constraints. Therefore, ambiguity might emerge in a natural way on the domain
of unfeasibility. Indeed, since it is not always possible to determine experimentally the
consequence they induce, unfeasible acts entail a genuine form of ambiguity that might be
described through nonadditive probability as in Schmeidler (1989).
Literature provides various explicit constructions of states of the world. Kreps (1979)
takes preference for flexibility, i.e. preference for larger menus of alternatives, to reveal
the individual’s subjective perception of his uncertain future preferences and identifies
the latter with subjective states. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) extend Kreps’
analysis so as to obtain uniqueness of the state space. In contrast, preferences apply here
to alternatives, and not menus, and subjective states are derived from betting behavior on
the outcomes of experiments, a simplified version of Moore’s (1999) definite experimental
projects. Experiments stand for achievable operations that can always be performed on
the random system and always return a definite outcome. Finally, feasible alternatives are
defined as consequences that are contingent upon the outcomes of experiments.
In Blume, Easley and Halpern (2006), uncertainty is described through a propositional
logic. The state space is obtained as the set of all truth assignments and is thus independent
of preferences. On the contrary, preferences are used here to derive a subjective implication
relation that incarnates the individual’s subjective understanding of causality. Subjective
implication determines indeed all the implications between the outcomes of experiments
that are perceived by the individual. The state space is obtained as the set of assignments of
outcomes to experiments that are consistent with subjective implication. Mathematically,
subjective implication induces a Boolean algebra and the state space is constructed through
the Stone (1936) representation theorem.
Lipman (1999) uses preferences to identify the correct logical implications that are recog-
nized by the individual. Since he studies individuals who are not logically omniscient and
fail to infer all logical implications of what they know, correct logical implications typically
exist that are not reflected in preferences. Herein, the individual is logically omniscient:
behavior is consistent with all the purely logical implications that are part of his description
of uncertainty. But behavior is allowed to be consistent with additional and extra-logical
implications. The latter represent the prior information that is available in the decision
process. As in the portfolio example stated above, more prior information is expected to
lead to belief in more subjective implications and therefore to smaller state spaces.
2 A framework for Savage representations
2.1 Framework
The behavioral definition of states of the world heavily relies upon the notions of ob-
servability and feasibility. Intuitively, an event is said to be observable if there exists an
experiment that can always be effectively performed and always determines whether the
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event holds or not. An act is said to be feasible if its consequences are contingent upon
observable events. The consequence induced by a feasible act is thus totally devoid of am-
biguity: experiments always determine the specific consequence that a feasible act yields.
To motivate this notion, think of two contracting parties who disagree about what they
owe to each other. As long as their contract is feasible in this sense, it is always possible
to determine experimentally who is right and who is wrong.
Observability is modeled as follows: an individual is assumed to describe the uncertainty
generated by a random system in terms of the experiments he knows and considers to be
relevant. Such an experiment represents an operation that can always be performed on
the random system. Whenever effectively performed, it returns one and only one of two
possible outcomes, conventionally called yes and no. The set E of experiments is endowed
with some trivial elements and some algebraic operations:
(1) y, n ∈ E are trivial experiments,
(2) For each e, f ∈ E , e ◦ f ∈ E is the product experiment,
(3) For each e ∈ E , e′ ∈ E is the complementary experiment.
Experiments y and n are trivial in that they always return yes and no respectively. Per-
forming them simply consists in doing nothing and assigning the outcomes yes to y and no
to n. In addition, performing a product experiment of the form e◦f consists in performing
e first and then f . Experiment e ◦ f returns yes if each of e and f does. Furthermore, a
complementary experiment e′ is obtained from e by switching the circumstances at which
yes and no are replied. Thus, e′ returns yes if and only if e returns no.
Each experiment e ∈ E induces two events: e returns yes and e returns no. Each event
is observable since an experiment exists, by definition, that always determines whether
it obtains or not. Such observable events represent the objective information that the
individual could acquire by experimentation, observation or calculation and that is quite
independent from his subjective speculation on uncertainty and causality.
In terms of the introductory example, there are two elementary relevant experiments: they
determine whether the price of each asset goes up or not. To perform them effectively, the
manager simply has to consult his information system. If the manager truly believes that,
whenever the first price goes up, the second one also does, he is expected to be indifferent
between a bet on the first price going up (ie. experiment 1 returning yes) and a bet on the
two prices going up (ie. experiments 1 and 2 returning yes in that order).
In the Savage omelette example, there are again two elementary relevant experiments. The
first one determines whether a given egg is rotten or not and the second one determines
whether a rotten egg spoils a six-egg omelette or not. To perform them effectively, it is
sufficient for the individual to break an egg to observe its actual inner state or to cook and
taste a six-egg omelette with one rotten egg. If the individual truly thinks that using a
rotten egg for a six-egg omelette spoils the omelette, then he is expected to be indifferent
between a bet on experiment 1 returning yes and a bet on both experiments 1 and 2
returning yes in that order. Finally, the following example is used throughout the paper
to illustrate various aspects of the argument.
Example Consider a countable collection of coins. An experiment can only involve a finite
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number of coins. For instance, e = examine coin 1 and then coin 3 and respond yes if and
only if both coins land on heads and f = examine coin 2 and then coin 4 and respond yes
if and only if both coins land on heads are experiments while examine all coins labelled
with an even number and respond yes if and only if they all land on heads is not such an
experiment since it relies upon an unfeasible operation. Then, e ◦ f is the experiment that
consists in examining coins 1, 3, 2 and 4 in this order and returns yes if and only if all
four coins land on heads. Experiment e′ consists in examining coin 1 and then coin 3 and
returns yes if and only if at least one of the two coins lands on tails.
Following Savage (1954), a consequence is anything that may happen to the person. Let A0
stand for the set of consequences. Adapting Blume, Easley and Halpern’s (2006) notion of
syntactic programs, the set A of acts is defined through finite combinations of experiments
and consequences:
(1) Each consequence is an act,
(2) For any experiment e ∈ E and any acts a, b ∈ A, e(a, b) ∈ A is also an act.
Each consequence is thus identified with the certain act that always yields this consequence.
An act of the form e(a, b) delivers the same consequences as a if e returns yes and the same
ones as b if e returns no. The order of an act is defined as the number of steps used in its
recursive construction. Additionally, acts can be seen as consequences that are contingent
on the outcomes of experiments. Since experiments can always be effectively performed
and always return a definite outcome, these acts are feasible in the sense that it is always
possible to determine the consequence they are supposed to yield.
Finally, preferences % represent the behavior of the individual and apply to acts. As usual,
≻ and ∼ denote strict preference and indifference respectively. This paper thus focuses
on preference given observability and feasibility constraints. As argued below in greater
detail, the notions of observability and feasibility provide a much compelling justification
for the axioms and the Savage representations presented in the next sections.
Example (cont.) Think of monetary consequences and let a0 and b0 stand for $100 and
$0 respectively. The act a = f(a0, b0) stands for a bet that pays $100 if coins 2 and 4 are
observed in this order to land on heads and $0 otherwise. Similarly, e(f(a0, b0), b0) pays
the same amount as a if coins 1 and 3 are observed in this order to land on heads and
$0 otherwise while e ◦ f(a0, b0) pays $100 if coins 1, 3, 2 and 4 are observed in this order
to land on heads and $0 otherwise. An individual is naturally expected to be indifferent
between the two latter acts, which illustrates Axiom B1 below.
2.2 Savage representations
This section presents Savage representations whose definition involves a state space, an
interpretation, a probability measure and a utility function. A state space is a non-empty
topological space Ω that is Hausdorff, compact and zero-dimensional. Let L(Ω) denote
the finite algebra of its clopen subsets (sets that are open and closed). Elements of Ω are
called states of the world and elements of L(Ω) are called Savage events.
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Given a state space Ω, an interpretation is a mapping K : E −→ L(Ω) that makes the
connection between states and experiments and satisfies the following conditions:
(1) K : E −→ L(Ω) is surjective,
(2) ∀e, f ∈ E , K(e ◦ f) = K(e) ∩K(f),
(3) ∀e ∈ E , K(e′) = K(e)c,
(4) K(y) = Ω and K(n) = ∅.
Thanks to the interpretation K, each state of the world encodes the outcomes of all ex-
periments: the individual considers that experiment e ∈ E returns yes at state ω ∈ Ω
if and only if ω ∈ K(e). Put differently, K(e) collects all states at which e returns yes
and performing e amounts to determining whether K(e) holds or not. The interpretation
makes it thus possible to represent an experiment through the Savage event it determines.
As a result, it also models the individual’s subjective understanding of causal relationships
between the outcomes of experiments. To see this, consider two experiments e, f ∈ E such
that K(e) ⊆ K(f). Then, f returns yes at any state at which e returns yes so that the
individual believes that, whenever e returns yes, f also does.
In addition, surjectivity in condition (1) implies that each Savage event E ∈ L(Ω) corre-
sponds to some experiment e ∈ E . Each Savage event E is thus observable in the sense that
there is an experiment that always determines whether E holds or not. Conditions (2), (3)
and (4) directly capture the content of the intuitive definitions of products, complements
and trivial experiments given in the previous section. Since a product experiment returns
yes if and only if each factor also does, the product is interpreted as the set-theoretic inter-
section. Since a complement returns yes if and only if the underlying experiment returns
no, the complementation is interpreted as the set-theoretic complementation. Finally, since
the trivial experiments y and n always return yes and no respectively, they are interpreted
as the corresponding trivial subsets of the state space.
The Hausdorff requirement is here equivalent to the condition that for any two distinct
states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, there exists an experiment e ∈ E such that ω ∈ K(e) and ω′ ∈ K(e′). This
means that performing e always results in one of the two states being refuted: if e returns
yes, then ω′ is refuted while, if e returns no, then ω is refuted. Therefore, the Hausdorff
requirement ensures the existence of an experiment that always refutes one of two given
distinct states. Moreover, due to compactness, a partition over Ω made of Savage events
is necessarily finite. Consequently, any such partition is observable in the sense that it
would be possible to use the experiments in E to construct another feasible experimental
procedure that would always determine the one cell in the partition that obtains. At
last, zero-dimensionality requires any open set to be a potentially infinite union of Savage
events. An open set E is therefore necessarily of the form E = ∪i∈IK(ei), where all ei are
experiments, and to say that E holds amounts to saying that there exists i ∈ I such that
ei returns yes. Thus, an open set represents an existential statement on the outcomes of
experiments. Whenever I is infinite, the statement is unobservable: E can certainly be
verified in practice since it holds whenever some ei is identified that returns yes, but it
remains irrefutable in the sense that there is no experimental procedure likely to refute
it. Dually, closed sets represent universal statements on the outcomes of experiments that
are certainly refutable but may remain unverifiable. Due to the Hausdorff requirement, a
7
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state is a typical example of such an unverifiable statement.
Example (cont.) The set Ω = {heads, tails}N provides an example of a state space.
Open sets in Ω are defined as unions of products Πn≥0An where each An is a subset of
{head, tails} and all but finitely many An are equal to {heads, tails}. All clopen sets are
of the form E = {ω ∈ Ω, ω(i1) = α1, ..., ω(in) = αn} where (ik)
n
k=1 and (αk)
n
k=1 are finite
sequences in N and {heads, tails} respectively. A Savage event thus only determines the
outcome of a finite number of coins. An interpretation K can be defined in the following
way: for each experiment e, let i1, ... , in be the labels of the finitely many coins involved
by e and α1, ... , αn be the corresponding outcomes. Then, the set K(e) is defined as the
Savage event {ω ∈ Ω, ω(i1) = α1, ..., ω(in) = αn}. Moreover, consider the closed subset
E = {ω ∈ Ω, ∀k ≥ 0, ω(k) = heads} ⊆ Ω which corresponds to the situation where all
coins land on heads. Such an event is certainly refutable for it is sufficient to exhibit one
coin that lands on tails to refute it. But it remains unverifiable since it would take an
infinite number of operations to verify it. Dually, the open subset Ec = {ω ∈ Ω, ∃k ≥ 1,
ω(k) = tails} is verified whenever a coin that lands on tails is exhibited but remains
irrefutable in the sense that a finite number of operations cannot but fail to refute it.
A function f mapping states onto consequences is said to be a Savage act if it is measurable
with respect to L(Ω), i.e. for all a0 ∈ A0, {f = a0} ∈ L(Ω) is a Savage event. Let A(Ω)
denote the set of Savage acts. Due to compactness, a Savage act has necessarily a finite
range. For any Savage acts f, g ∈ A(Ω) and any Savage event E ⊆ Ω, let fEg ∈ A(Ω)
denote the Savage act that is equal to f over E and to g over Ec. Each consequence
a0 ∈ A0 is identified with the constant Savage act that delivers a0 at each state.
Given a state space Ω, an interpretation K over Ω can always be inductively extended into
a surjective mapping ϕ : A −→ A(Ω) according to:
(1) ∀a0 ∈ A0, ϕ(a0) = a0,
(2) ∀e ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, ϕ(e(a, b)) = ϕ(a)K(e)ϕ(b).
The interpretation of experiments is thus extended into an interpretation of acts that takes
the form of a functional preserving consequences and products of acts. Surjectivity makes
it clear that each Savage act f ∈ A(Ω) corresponds to some primitive act a ∈ A and is
thus considered by the individual to be feasible. Alternatively, the feasibility of Savage
acts follows from the requirement of measurability with respect to Savage events which, as
explained above, are observable.
A utility function u is a function mapping consequences onto real numbers. A probability
measure over Ω is here defined as a set function P mapping Savage events onto the unit
interval of the reals and satisfying the following requirements:
(1) P(Ω) = 1,
(2) For all disjoint Savage events E,F ∈ L(Ω), P(E ∪ F ) = P(E) + P(F ),
(3) For all Savage events E,F ∈ L(Ω), if P(Ec ∪ F ) = 1, then E ⊆ F ,
(4) For all ǫ > 0, there exists a partition (E1, ..., En) of Ω made of Savage events such that
P(Ei) < ǫ for all i ∈ [1, n].
Given that L(Ω) is only a finite algebra of subsets, a probability measure is only required
to be finitely additive. Condition (3) is a normalization requirement for subjective state
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spaces. The equality P(Ec ∪ F ) = 1 captures in a probabilistic way the idea that the indi-
vidual thinks that Savage event E implies Savage event F . Then, condition (3) requires all
such probabilistic implications to be already encoded in the state space itself. To motivate
this requirement, recall the introductory portfolio example. It would certainly be possible
to deal with the manager’s understanding of uncertainty by assigning a null probability to
all inconsistent states. But if such null states were allowed, there would be more than one
state space to represent behavior. The normalization condition is precisely meant to forbid
null states and leads to uniqueness in the derivation of the state space. Condition (4) finally
appears in Kopylov (2007) and is the analogue of Savage’s nonatomicity requirement.
Definition 1 A preference relation % is said to have a Savage representation if there exist
a state space Ω, an interpretation K, a probability measure P and a nonconstant utility
function u such that, for all a, b ∈ A, a % b ⇐⇒ EPu(ϕ(a)) ≥ EPu(ϕ(b)).
In a Savage representation, the individual behaves as if he used the state space and inter-
pretation to formalize uncertainty and causality, and maximized seu over that state space
to make decisions. While the state space is exogenous in Savage (1954), its existence is
here a property of preferences and behavior. However, Savage representations entail a few
technical departures from the Savage version of seu. The state space is indeed equipped
here with a topological structure that induces notions of observable events and feasible
acts. Probability is restricted to observable events, and preference is restricted to feasible
acts. Moreover, the state space is normalized in the sense of condition (3) in the definition
of probability and condition (4) modifies the requirement of nonatomicity.
In addition, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994), Mukerji (1997) and Lipman (1999) show in
different ways that non-seu preferences over a certain state space can be reformulated as
seu preferences over larger state spaces. Their extended spaces typically lead to probability
judgements on unobservable events and preferences on unfeasible acts. Due to observability
and feasibility constraints, such seu reformulations of non-seu preferences are not possible
here. More formally, it would be possible to define a weaker representation of preferences
that would only require the existence of a state space Ω, an interpretationK and preferences
%Ω over Savage acts such that a % b ⇐⇒ ϕ(a) %Ω ϕ(b), for all a, b ∈ A. The proof of
Theorem 1 would then support the following claim: if a weaker representation exists where
induced preferences %Ω are seu, then induced preferences must necessarily be seu in all
such weaker representations.
Definition 2 Two Savage representations supported by Ω1, K1, P1, u1 and Ω2, K2, P2, u2
are said to be equivalent if there exists a bijective, bimeasurable and bicontinuous mapping
ǫ : Ω2 −→ Ω1 and real numbers α ∈ R++ and β ∈ R such that:
(1) For all e ∈ E , K1(e) = ǫ(K2(e)),
(2) For all E ∈ L(Ω1), P1(E) = P2({ǫ ∈ E}),
(3) For all a0 ∈ A0, u1(a0) = αu2(a0) + β.
The notion of equivalence for Savage representations plays an important role in the unique-
ness of the subjective state space. Strictly speaking, one cannot hope to obtain uniqueness
since it is always possible to relabel states in a given Savage representation and construct a
9
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second representation. Two Savage representations are said to be equivalent precisely when
they are just a relabeling of each other. More precisely, there is equivalence when there
exists a bijective mapping between the two state spaces that preserves both the topology
and the algebra of observability. In addition, the interpretation and subjective probability
in the one Savage representation must be deducible from their counterparts in the other
Savage representation through this bijection, and utility functions must be positive affine
transformation of each other.
3 Axioms for Savage representations
3.1 Axioms
This section presents the axioms that are used in the derivation of a Savage representation.
They are split into three groups. Axioms in the first group essentially lead to the derivation
of subjective probability and utility. They are well known in the literature since they are
straightforward reformulations of the axioms of Savage (1954) and Kopylov (2007). In
particular, A2 is the direct analogue of the Sure Thing Principle and its specific role is
discussed in greater detail in the next section. Note also that the seventh axiom of Savage
is not needed at all since Savage acts have necessarily a finite range in the state space to be
constructed. In Axiom A3, E∗ stands for the set of nonnull experiments. An experiment
e ∈ E is said to be null if, for any acts a, b, c ∈ A, acts e(a, c) and e(b, c) are indifferent.
A1 ∀e ∈ E , ∀a, b, c ∈ A, a % b or b % a and if a % b and b % c, then a % c
A2 ∀e ∈ E , ∀a, b, c, d ∈ A, e(a, c) % e(b, c) ⇐⇒ e(a, d) % e(b, d)
A3 ∀e ∈ E∗, ∀a0, b0 ∈ A0, ∀c ∈ A, a0 % b0 ⇐⇒ e(a0, c) % e(b0, c)
A4 ∀e, f ∈ E , ∀a0, b0, c0, d0 ∈ A0 with a0 ≻ b0 and c0 ≻ d0, e(a0, b0) % f(a0, b0) ⇐⇒
e(c0, d0) % f(c0, d0)
A5 ∃a0, b0 ∈ A0, a0 ≻ b0
A6 ∀a, b, c ∈ A such that a ≻ b, there is a finite family (ei)
n
i=1 of experiments such that:
(1) ∀i, j ∈ [1, n], i 6= j =⇒ ∀a′, b′ ∈ A, ei ◦ ej(a
′, b′) ∼ b′
(2) ∀a′, b′ ∈ A, e′1 ◦ ... ◦ e
′
n(a
′, b′) ∼ b′
(3) ∀i ∈ [1, n], ei(c, a) ≻ b and a ≻ ei(c, b)
Axioms in the second group regulate the interaction between preferences over acts and the
algebraic structure of the set of experiments. All these axioms can be justified through the
rules for assigning outcomes to product and complement experiments that are presented
in Section 2. For instance, Axiom B1 captures the behavioral content of the interpretation
of the product: since a product replies yes if and only if each factor does, detaining a if
e ◦ f returns yes and b otherwise is always indifferent to detaining f(a, b) if e returns yes
and b otherwise. For Axiom B2, since y stands for a trivial experiment that always returns
yes, detaining a if y returns yes and b otherwise is expected to be indifferent to a. B2 also
captures the same idea for experiment n. Since a complementary experiment returns yes
if and only if the underlying experiment returns no, each act e′(a, b) is somehow the same
10
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thing as e(b, a) and B3 then requires each act f(e′(a, b), c) to be indifferent to f(e(b, a), c).
Axioms B4, B5 and B6 capture a form of idempotence, commutativity and associativity for
the product of experiments. Finally, B7 expresses the idea that a product experiment of
the form e ◦ e′ always returns no. In a Savage framework, these axioms are systematically
satisfied since the acts that are compared in each of them are in fact equal to each other.
B1 ∀e, f ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, e ◦ f(a, b) ∼ e(f(a, b), b)
B2 ∀a, b ∈ A, y(a, b) ∼ a and n(a, b) ∼ b
B3 ∀e ∈ E , ∀a, b, c ∈ A, f(e′(a, b), c) ∼ f(e(b, a), c)
B4 ∀e, f, g ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, e ◦ e(a, b) ∼ e(a, b)
B5 ∀e, f, g ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, e ◦ f(a, b) ∼ f ◦ e(a, b)
B6 ∀e, f, g ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, e ◦ (f ◦ g)(a, b) ∼ (e ◦ f) ◦ g(a, b)
B7 ∀e ∈ E , ∀a, b ∈ A, e ◦ e′(a, b) ∼ b
There are specific situations where the previous axioms cannot be expected to be satisfied.
Consider, for instance, that the individual designs a state of the world at which the product
experiment e ◦ f does not return yes and yet each of experiments e and f returns yes.
This happens when the individual considers that the outcome of f depends upon whether
e is effectively performed, a pattern that is reminiscent of the notion of contextuality in
quantum physics. Then, Axiom B1 might fail to hold, since e◦f(a, b) and e(f(a, b), b) could
be considered at this state to yield respectively b and a. Similarly, consider this time an
individual designing a state of the world at which none of experiments e and e′ returns yes.
This happens when the individual perceives unforeseen contingencies in the sense of Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini (2001), refuses to speculate about the possible causes of outcomes
and wants his behavior to be consistent with his awareness of his ignorance. Then, Axiom
B3 might fail to hold, since acts f(e′(a, b), c) and f(e(b, a), c) could be considered to yield
respectively b and a at this state. However, since the experiments involved by these two
cases violate the rules of assignment of outcomes to product and complement experiments,
they do not really qualify as experiments in the sense of the paper and should not be
allowed in the primitive set E in the first place. In this sense, it is really the fact that
preference is restricted to feasible acts that justifies these axioms.
Axioms in the last group regulate the interaction between subjective implication and the
algebraic structure of the set of experiments. Subjective implication ≤ is derived from
primitive preferences % in the following way:
∀e, f ∈ E , e ≤ f if ∀a, b ∈ A, e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b)
Fix two experiments e, f ∈ E . Whenever, for all acts a, b ∈ A, the individual is indifferent
between detaining a if e ◦ f returns yes and b otherwise and detaining a if e returns yes
and b otherwise, he is said to behave as if he believed that the event e returns yes implies
the event f returns yes, which is denoted by e ≤ f . Note the formal analogy between the
definition of subjective implication and that of domination in Kreps (1979). Subjective
equivalence is denoted by ≈. Experiments are subjectively equivalent when the individual
believes that they measure the same property of the random system.
11
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Some of the subjective implications captured by≤ can be said to be purely logical. Consider
two experiments e, f ∈ E such that e = e ◦ f . Then, the individual has to believe that
the event e returns yes implies the event f returns yes in some obvious sense that does
not involve preferences at all, but is a direct consequence of the idea that a product
returns yes if and only if each factor also does. Observe that, by construction of subjective
implication, e = e ◦ f necessarily results in e ≤ f . As a result, the individual is logically
omniscient in that his behavior is consistent with the purely logical implications that are
part of his own description of uncertainty. To deal with failures of logical omniscience, it
would be necessary to construct subjective implication in a different way. For instance,
Lipman (1999) uses a primitive family of preferences representing dynamic behavior to
derive his information ordering. See Lemma 4 for two equivalent definitions of subjective
implication which are more directly comparable to this ordering.
Subjective implication is allowed to capture additional and extra-logical implications re-
flecting the prior information that is available in the decision process. But some consistency
is required that is imposed through the remaining axioms. Axiom C1 is a richness condi-
tion for the set of experiments that delivers a form of distributivity. Axiom C2 requires
complementation to reverse subjective implication. Thinking of subjective implication as
the set-theoretic inclusion, it is easy to see that these axioms are again necessarily satisfied
in a Savage framework.
C1 ∀e, f, g ∈ E , if e ◦ f ≤ g, then there exist h, k ∈ E such that e ≤ h, f ≤ k and h ◦ k ≈ g
C2 ∀e, f ∈ E , e ≤ f =⇒ f ′ ≤ e′
Example (cont.) Assume that coin 1 lands on heads is subjectively equivalent to coin 2
lands on heads. By C2, coin 1 lands on tails must also be subjectively equivalent to coin
2 lands on tails. By B5, detaining a if coin 1 lands on tails and b otherwise must then be
indifferent to detaining a if coin 2 lands on tails and b otherwise.
3.2 Axiomatic characterization of Savage representations
Theorem 1 uses the previous axioms to formulate a characterization of Savage represen-
tations. In the normative approach mentioned in the introduction, this result advises an
individual who would adhere to the axioms to adopt a Savage representation and thus
think of uncertainty, events and acts directly in terms of states of the world. In empirical
applications, the theorem shows that these axioms represent simple testable predictions
that can be derived from the seu assumption over an unknown subjective state space.
Whenever axioms are satisfied, it is even possible to reconstruct a Savage representation
from preferences uniquely up to equivalence. Whenever axioms are violated, there cannot
exist a state space over which behavior conforms to the Savage theory and a refutation of
seu is therefore obtained that is robust to misspecification of the state space.
Theorem 1
Preferences % conform to Axioms A1–6, B1–7 and C1–2 if and only if they have a Savage
representation. Moreover, any two Savage representations of % are equivalent.
12
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The construction of a Savage representation works in the following way: Lemmas 1 and 2
study the properties of subjective implication and show that the set of classes of subjective
equivalence has the structure of a Boolean algebra. Then, the Stone theorem delivers a
state space and an interpretation. In addition, Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 show that a certain
condition called consequentialism is satisfied. Consequentialism requires any two primitive
acts that induce the same Savage act through ϕ to be indifferent. See L5.3 for a more
precise formulation. At last, Lemma 6 uses consequentialism to construct preferences %Ω
over Savage acts and derives a probability measure and a utility function through the
Kopylov (2007) version of seu.
Theorem 1 is consistent with Hammond’s (1988) consequentialist foundations of seu and
defense of the Sure Thing Principle (stp). These foundations shed light on the method-
ological problems in assuming a preference relation that would not satisfy Savage’s stp:
under a dynamic version of consequentialism, such preferences necessarily produce a form of
inconsistency in dynamic behavior. See also Machina (1989), Hanany and Klibanoff (2007)
or Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009). In contrast, the proof of Theorem 1 captures the same
intuition in a purely static framework. While A2 plays no role in the derivation of a subjec-
tive state space, the derivation of preferences %Ω over Savage acts heavily relies upon this
axiom: A2 is indeed used to construct a family of preferences representing the dynamic
behavior of the individual (Lemma 4) and show that the family satisfies both dynamic con-
sistency (L5.1) and the dynamic version of consequentialism (L5.2) which together end up
implying consequentialism (L5.3) and make it possible to construct preferences %Ω (L6.1).
However, since A2 is the direct analogue of stp, preferences %Ω necessarily satisfy stp by
construction. Put differently, whenever preferences over Savage acts are allowed to violate
stp, then it is not clear why they exist in the first place.
The issue that is raised here might be overcome by an axiomatic characterization of a
notion of epistemic sophistication that would play a similar role to Machina and Schmei-
dler’s (1992) notion of probabilistic sophistication. The latter justifies the existence of
preferences over lotteries that do not necessarily conform to the von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) axioms expected utility under risk. Similarly, epistemic sophistication
would require a state space Ω, an interpretation K and a non-necessarily seu preference
relation %Ω over Savage acts such that, for all a, b ∈ A, a % b ⇐⇒ ϕ(a) %Ω ϕ(b). After
all, the fact that the present construction fails to produce ambiguity sensitive preferences
over the subjective state space does not mean that other constructions would also fail.
Alternatively, extensions of Savage representations beyond the domains of observability and
feasibility might provide a different way to allow for ambiguity. Indeed, a Savage represen-
tation ends up producing restrictions on the likelihood plausibly assigned to unobservable
events. The likelihood assigned to such an event has to remain below (resp. above) the
subjective probability of any observable event that includes it (resp. it contains). These
restrictions may fail to be strong enough to ensure additivity over the whole domain of
unobservability. As a result, ambiguity and nonadditive probability might emerge as a way
to describe subjective beliefs over unobservable events and behavior over unfeasible acts.
13
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4 Appendix
4.1 Boolean algebras
A partially-ordered set (poset) is a set L together with a binary relation ≤ on L that is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. A lower semilattice is a poset that has a greatest
lower bound (meet) for any nonempty finite subset. An upper semilattice is a poset that
has a lowest upper bound (join) for any nonempty finite subset. A lattice is a poset that
has both a meet and a join. The meet and join of two elements x, y ∈ L are denoted
respectively by x ∧ y and x ∨ y.
A lower semilattice L is distributive if, for all x, y, z ∈ L such that x ∧ y ≤ z, there exist
x′, y′ ∈ L such that x ≤ x′, y ≤ y′ and x′ ∧ y′ = z. A lattice L is distributive if, for all
x, y, z ∈ L, x∧ (y ∨ z) = (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ z). Any lattice is distributive as a semilattice if and
only if it is distributive as a lattice.
A lattice isomorphism is a bijective application between two lattices that preserves the
order as well as joins and meets. A lattice that is isomorphic to a distributive lattice is
distributive itself.
A bounded lattice is a term (L,≤, 0, 1) such that 0 (resp. 1) is the necessarily unique
lowest (resp. greatest) element and is the identity element of the join (resp. the meet). A
complemented lattice L is a bounded lattice for which, for each x ∈ L, there is x′ ∈ L such
that x ∨ x′ = 1 and x ∧ x′ = 0.
A Boolean algebra is defined as complemented and distributive lattice. A Boolean algebra
isomorphism is a bijective application between two Boolean algebras that preserves the
order as well as joins, meets and complements.
Typical examples of Boolean algebras are given by topological Boolean spaces, that is,
Hausdorff, compact and zero-dimensional topological spaces. A topological space Ω is said
to be Hausdorff if, for any distinct ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, there exist disjoint open sets E,E ′ ⊆ Ω such
that ω ∈ E and ω′ ∈ E ′. It is said to be compact if every open cover of Ω has a finite
subcover. It is said to be zero-dimensional if every open set is the union of the clopen sets
(sets that are both open and closed) it contains. Then, the set L(Ω) of clopen subsets of
Ω has the structure of a Boolean algebra for the standard set-theoretic operations.
Consider a Boolean algebra L and define its Stone space Ω as the set of all homomorphisms
from L onto {0, 1}. Such an homomorphism is a mapping ω : L −→ {0, 1} that preserves
the Boolean operations. The Stone space Ω can be equipped with a topology constructed
as the topology induced by Ω given the product topology on {0, 1}L obtained from the
discrete topology on each copy of {0, 1}. Let L(Ω) be the finite algebra of its clopen
subsets and define K : L −→ L(Ω) by K(x) = {ω ∈ Ω, ω(x) = 1}, for all x ∈ L. The
Stone representation theorem shows that Ω is Hausdorff, compact and zero-dimensional
and proves that K is a Boolean algebra isomorphism. As a result, all Boolean algebras can
be represented through topological Boolean spaces. At last, observe that clopen subsets in
Ω are exactly the sets of the form {β ∈ Ω, β(x) = 1}, for a given (and necessarily unique)
x ∈ L.
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4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
From now on, it is assumed that % conforms to axioms A1-6, B1-7 and C1-2. Recall that ≤
and ≈ denote subjective implication and equivalence respectively. Lemma 1 studies some
properties of subjective implication.
Lemma 1
(L1.1) ∀e ∈ E , ∀a ∈ A, e(a, a) ∼ a
(L1.2) ∀e, f ∈ E , if e ≈ f , then, ∀a, b ∈ A, e(a, b) ∼ f(a, b)
(L1.3) ∀e, f, g ∈ E , e ◦ e ≈ e, e ◦ f ≈ f ◦ e and e ◦ (f ◦ g) ≈ (e ◦ f) ◦ g
(L1.4) ∀e ∈ E , e′′ ≈ e and e ◦ e′ ≈ n
(L1.5) ∀e ∈ E , e ◦ y ≈ e, e ◦ n ≈ n and y′ ≈ n
(L1.6) ≤ is reflexive and transitive
(L1.7) ∀e, f ∈ E , e ◦ f ≤ e
(L1.8) ∀e, f, g, h ∈ E , if e ≤ f and g ≤ h, then e ◦ g ≤ f ◦ h
Proof (L1.1 ) Consider an act a ∈ A. By B7, a ∼ e ◦ e′(a, a). By A1 and B1, a ∼
e(e′(a, a), a). By A1 and B3, a ∼ e(e(a, a), a). By A1 and B1, a ∼ e ◦ e(a, a). Finally, by
A1 and B4, a ∼ e(a, a). (L1.2 ) This is a direct consequence of B5. (L1.3 ) It is simple
but fastidious to show L1.3, L1.4 and L1.5. For instance, consider an experiment e ∈ E
and two acts a, b ∈ A. Then, by B1, (e ◦ e) ◦ e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ e(e(a, b), b) and, by A1 and B4,
(e◦e)◦e(a, b) ∼ e(e(a, b), b). By A1 and B1, (e◦e)◦e(a, b) ∼ e◦e(a, b), which shows e◦e ≤ e.
Furthermore, by A1, B4 and B6, e ◦ (e ◦ e)(a, b) ∼ e(a, b), which shows e ≤ e ◦ e. Use
A1, B1, B4, B5 and B6 to show commutativity and associativity in L1.3. (L1.4 ) Consider
an experiment e ∈ E and two acts a, b ∈ A. Then, by B1, e ◦ e′′(a, b) ∼ e(e′′(a, b), b). By
A1 and B3, e ◦ e′′(a, b) ∼ e(e(a, b), b). By A1, B1 and B4, e ◦ e′′(a, b) ∼ e(a, b), which
shows e ≤ e′′. In addition, by B5, e′′ ◦ e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ e′′(a, b) ∼ e(a, b). By A1, B2 and
B3, e′′ ◦ e(a, b) ∼ e′′(a, b), which shows e′′ ≤ e. For the second part of L1.4, to show that
n ≤ e◦e′, it is sufficient to show that n ≤ e, for any e ∈ E . Fix an experiment e ∈ E and two
acts a, b ∈ A. Then, by B1, n◦e(a, b) ∼ n(e(a, b), b). By A1 and B2, n◦e(a, b) ∼ b ∼ n(a, b),
which shows n ≤ e for any e ∈ E and, therefore, n ≤ e ◦ e′. Moreover, proceeding as above
and using B5, (e◦e′)◦n(a, b) ∼ b. By A1 and B7, (e◦e′)◦n(a, b) ∼ e◦e′(a, b), which shows
e◦e′ ≤ n and thus delivers L1.4. (L1.5 ) Let us prove e◦y ≈ e and y′ ≈ n only. Fix two acts
a, b ∈ A. By A1, B1, B4 and B6, e◦(e◦y)(a, b) ∼ e◦e(y(a, b), b) ∼ e(y(a, b), b) ∼ e◦y(a, b).
Then, by A1, B1, B2 and B5, e ◦ (e ◦ y)(a, b) ∼ y ◦ e(a, b) ∼ y(e(a, b), b) ∼ e(a, b), which
shows e ≤ e ◦ y. At last, use A1 and B5 to obtain (e ◦ y) ◦ e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ y(a, b) and
e ◦ y ≤ e. Proceed similarly for e ◦ n ≈ n. Moreover, it has already be shown that n
subjectively implies any e ∈ E so that n ≤ y′. Finally, since y′ ◦ n ≈ n, and by L1.2,
y′ ◦ n(a, b) ∼ n(a, b) ∼ b for all a, b ∈ A. But, using A1, B2, B3, y′(a, b) ∼ y(b, a) ∼ b.
Therefore, y′ ◦ n(a, b) ∼ y′(a, b) and y′ ≤ n. (L1.6 ) Reflexivity is a direct consequence
of B4. For transitivity, consider experiments e, f, g ∈ E such that e ≤ f and f ≤ g.
Then, for all a, b ∈ A, e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b). In particular, for all a, b ∈ A and all h ∈ E ,
e(h(a, b), b) ∼ e ◦ f(h(a, b), b) and, by A1 and B1, e ◦ h(a, b) ∼ (e ◦ f) ◦ h(a, b) (⋆). Use A1,
B1, B5 and B6 to show that (e◦f)◦h(a, b) and f ◦(e◦h)(a, b) are always indifferent so that,
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by (⋆), e ◦h(a, b) ∼ f ◦ (e ◦h)(a, b). In addition, the fact that f ≤ g implies, proceeding as
above, that , for all a, b ∈ A and all h ∈ E , f ◦ h(a, b) ∼ (f ◦ g) ◦ h(a, b). In particular, one
obtains e ◦ h(a, b) ∼ f ◦ (e ◦ h)(a, b) ∼ (f ◦ g) ◦ (e ◦ h)(a, b). Still by A1, B1, B5 and B6,
(f ◦ g) ◦ (e ◦ h)(a, b) and (e ◦ f) ◦ (g ◦ h)(a, b) can easily be shown to be indifferent so that
e◦h(a, b) ∼ (e◦f)◦(g◦h)(a, b). Replace h with g◦h in (⋆) to obtain e◦h(a, b) ∼ e◦(g◦h)(a, b)
and, by B6, e ◦ h(a, b) ∼ (e ◦ g) ◦ h(a, b). Finally, take h = y and apply A1, L1.2 and L1.5
to obtain e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ g(a, b) and conclude that e ≤ g. (L1.7 ) It is sufficient to note
that, by A1, B1, B4, B5 and B6, (e ◦ f) ◦ e(a, b) and e ◦ f(a, b) are always indifferent.
(L1.8 ) Proceeding as for transitivity, one obtains e◦ (g ◦k)(a, b) ∼ (e◦f)◦ (g ◦k)(a, b) and
g◦((e◦f)◦k)(a, b) ∼ (g◦h)◦((e◦f)◦k)(a, b), for all a, b ∈ A and k ∈ E . Given B4, B5 and B6,
it is possible to show e◦(g◦k)(a, b) ∼ (e◦g)◦k(a, b), (e◦f)◦(g◦k)(a, b) ∼ g◦((e◦f)◦k)(a, b)
and (g◦h)◦((e◦f)◦k)(a, b) ∼ ((e◦g)◦(f◦h))◦k(a, b). Combining these various indifferences,
one obtains (e ◦ g) ◦ k(a, b) ∼ ((e ◦ g) ◦ (f ◦ h)) ◦ k(a, b). Apply this to k = y and use A1,
L1.2 and L1.5 to obtain e ◦ g ≤ f ◦ h.
Let L denote the set of classes of the equivalence relation≈ on E . The class of an experiment
e is denoted [e]. For x, y ∈ L, define x ≤ y if e ≤ f with e ∈ x and f ∈ y and let
x ∧ y = [e ◦ f ], x′ = [e′] and x ∨ y = (x′ ∧ y′)′ where e ∈ x and f ∈ y. Lemma 1 together
with C2 make these definitions meaningful. In addition, let 0 and 1 denote the classes of
y and n respectively. In the next lemma, L2.1 shows that L is a Boolean algebra. In L2.2,
Ω stands for the Stone space induced by L. At last, let K(x) = {ω ∈ Ω, ω(x) = 1} and
K(e) = K([e]), for all e ∈ E and x ∈ L.
Lemma 2
(L2.1) (L,≤,∧,∨, 0, 1, ′) is a Boolean algebra
(L2.2) Ω is a state space
(L2.3) K : L −→ L(Ω) is an isomorphism of Boolean algebras.
(L2.4) K : E −→ L(Ω) is an interpretation over Ω.
Proof (L2.1 ) By L1.6, L is a poset. Then, note that, by L1.3, ∧ is necessarily idempotent,
commutative and associative. In addition, by L1.7 and L1.8, each x ∧ y is the greatest
lower bound of x and y. Also note that L1.4, L1.5 and Axiom C2 directly imply 0′ = 1,
x′′ = x, x ∧ x′ = 0, x ∨ x′ = 1 and x ≤ y ⇐⇒ y′ ≤ x′, for all x, y ∈ L. These remarks
imply that each x ∨ y is the lowest upper bound of x and y and, therefore, that L is a
lattice. In addition, Axiom C1 directly implies that L is distributive as a semilattice and,
therefore, distributive as a lattice as well. Since n subjectively implies each experiment
e (see proof of Lemma 1), 0 is indeed the lowest element and, similarly, 1 is the greatest
element. The lattice L is therefore bounded and previous results show that it is even a
Boolean algebra. (L2.2 ) By definition, Ω is a topological Boolean space and, due to A5, it
is nonempty. (L2.3 ) The fact that K : L −→ L(Ω) is an isomorphism simply reformulates
the Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras. (L2.4 ) Finally, K : E −→ L(Ω) is
an interpretation since, by L2.3, it is surjective and preserves products, complements and
trivial experiments.
Lemma 3
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(L3.1) ∀e, f ∈ E such that e ◦ f ≈ n, e(a, b) ∼ f(b, e(a, b)) ∀a, b ∈ A
(L3.2) en(a, en−1(a, ..., e2(a, e1(a, b))...)) ∼ e(a, b), for any acts a, b ∈ A, any finite sequence
(ei)
n
i=1 ∈ E
n of experiments and any experiment e ∈
∨
{[ei], i = 1...n}.
Proof (L3.1 ) Let x = [e] ∈ L and y = [f ] ∈ L. Then, x∧y = 0, x ≤ y′ and e ≤ f ′. For any
acts a, b ∈ A, one has e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f ′(a, b) and, by A1, B1 and B5, e(a, b) ∼ f ′(e(a, b), b).
Finally, A1, B2 and B3 imply e(a, b) ∼ f(b, e(a, b)). (L3.2 ) Let us first prove the result in
case n = 2. Note that e2 ≤ e so that in particular e2(a, e1(a, b)) ∼ e2 ◦ e(a, e1(a, b)) for all
a, b ∈ A. Using A1, B1 and B3, one obtains e2(a, e1(a, b)) ∼ h(a, b) where h = ((e2◦e)
′◦e′1)
′.
By L2.3, it is clear that K([h]) = K([e]) so that h ≈ e and, by L1.2, h(a, b) ∼ e(a, b).
Hence the result. Let us now prove the result at rank n + 1. Fix a, b ∈ A. Denote
c = en−1(a, ..., e2(a, e1(a, b))...) and d = en−2(a, ..., e2(a, e1(a, b))...) so that c = en−1(a, d).
Let f ∈ [e1] ∨ ... ∨ [en−1]. In addition, fix hn+1 ∈ [en+1] ∨ [en] and hn ∈ [hn+1] ∨ [f ].
Thanks to the case n = 2, one has: en+1(a, en(a, c)) ∼ hn+1(a, c). By induction hypothesis:
hn+1(a, c) = hn+1(a, en−1(a, d)) ∼ hn(a, b). By L2.3, K([hn]) = K([hn+1] ∨ [f ]) = K([e]) so
that, by L1.2, hn(a, b) ∼ e(a, b). Finally, en+1(a, en(a, c)) ∼ e(a, b), which shows the result.
For any e ∈ E and a, b ∈ A, define a %e b if there exists c ∈ A such that e(a, c) % e(b, c).
This definition is meaningful thanks to A2.
Lemma 4
(L4.1) For each e ∈ E , %e is complete and transitive
(L4.2) ∀e, f ∈ E , e ≤ f ⇐⇒ ∀a, b ∈ A, f(a, b) ∼e a
(L4.3) ∀e, f ∈ E , if e ≈ f , then ∀a, b ∈ A, a %e b ⇐⇒ a %f b
(L4.4) ∀e, f ∈ E , e ≤ f ⇐⇒ (∀a, b ∈ A, a %e b ⇐⇒ a %e◦f b)
Proof (L4.1 ) Completeness and transitivity follow from A1 and A2. (L4.2 ) If e ≤ f ,
then e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b), for all a, b ∈ A. By A1 and B1, e(a, b) ∼ e(f(a, b), b) and
a ∼e f(a, b). This argument can be reversed thanks to A2. (L4.3 ) Since e ≈ f , L1.2 implies
e(a, b) ∼ f(a, b), for all a, b and, therefore, thanks to A1, if e(a, c) % e(b, c) for some c, then
f(a, c) % f(b, c) for this c and reciprocally. (L4.4 ) Assume first that e ≤ f and a %e b.
By L4.2, for any c ∈ A, f(a, c) %e f(b, c). By A2 and B1, e ◦ f(a, c) % e ◦ f(b, c) and,
therefore, a %e◦f b. Note that this argument can be reversed. Assume the characterizing
condition. First, by A1, B1, B4, B5 and B6, for all a, b ∈ A, (e ◦ f) ◦ f(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b).
By A1 and B1, f(a, b) ∼e◦f a and, by the characterizing condition, f(a, b) ∼e a. L4.4 then
follows from L4.2.
Given the interpretation K obtained in Lemma 2, define ϕ : A −→ A(Ω) as in Definition 1.
For any Savage event E ∈ L(Ω) and acts a, b ∈ A, define a %E b if there exists e ∈ E such
that K(e) = E and a %e b. L4.3 makes this definition meaningful. Note that, for all acts
a, b ∈ A, a %Ω b if and only if a % b.
Lemma 5
(L5.1) ∀a, b ∈ A, for all measurable event E ∈ L(Ω) and for all measurable partition
(E1, ..., En) of E, if ∀i ∈ [1, n], a %Ei b, then a %E b
(L5.2) ∀a, b ∈ A, ∀E ∈ L(Ω), ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) on E =⇒ a ∼E b
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(L5.3) ∀a, b ∈ A, ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) =⇒ a ∼ b
Proof (L5.1 ) Define a family (ei)
n
i=1 of experiments such that K(ei) = Ei for all i ∈ [1, n]
and let e ∈ E be such that K(e) = E. Necessarily, i 6= j implies ei ◦ ej ≈ n and e ∈
∨
{[ei],
i = 1...n}. L3.1 can be iteratively applied in the following way: a ∼ e1(a, a) % e1(b, a) ∼
e2(a, e1(b, a)) thanks to A1, A2, L1.1 and L3.1 and assumption a %E1 b. Since a %E2 b, A2
and L3.1 further deliver a % e2(b, e1(b, a)) ∼ e3(e1(b, a), e2(b, e1(b, a))). But note that e3 ≤
e′1 so that, by L4.2, e
′
1(a, b) ∼e3 a. Therefore, by A2 and B3, e3(e1(b, a), e2(b, e1(b, a))) ∼
e3(a, e2(b, e1(b, a))) % e3(b, e2(b, e1(b, a))). Finally, a % e3(b, e2(b, e1(b, a))). By repeating
this process, a % en(b, en−1(b, ..., e2(b, e1(b, a))...)) and, by L3.2, a % e(b, a). By A1 and
L1.1, e(a, a) ∼ e(b, a) so that a %e b and a %E b. (L5.2 ) An induction on the set of acts
delivers L5.2. Indeed, if both a and b are of order 0, then a = φ(a) and ϕ(b) = b and,
therefore, a = b and a ∼E b. If a and b are of order less than n+ 1, then a = e(a
′, a′′) and
b = f(b′, b′′) with a′, a′′, b′, b′′ of order less than n. Let F1 = E ∩K(e) ∩K(f). Clearly, F1
is a Savage event and therefore of the form F1 = K(g), for some g ∈ E . One necessarily
has g ≤ e and g ≤ f so that, by L4.2, a = e(a′, a′′) ∼g a
′ and b = f(b′, b′′) ∼g b
′.
Therefore, a ∼F1 a
′ and b ∼F1 b
′. Moreover, ϕ(a′) = ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = ϕ(b′) on F1. By
induction, a′ ∼F1 b
′. By L4.1, a ∼F1 b. Similarly, a ∼F2 b, a ∼F3 b and a ∼F4 b with
F2 = E ∩K(e
′) ∩K(f), F3 = E ∩K(e) ∩K(f
′) and F4 = E ∩K(e
′) ∩K(f ′). Finally, by
L5.1, a ∼E b. (L5.3 ) follows from L5.1 and L5.2.
Lemma 6
(L6.1) There exists preferences %Ω over A(Ω) such that a % b⇐⇒ ϕ(a) %Ω ϕ(b), ∀a, b ∈ A
(L6.2) %Ω satisfy all of the axioms of Kopylov (2007)
Proof (L6.1 ) Consider the preference relation %Ω over A(Ω) defined for all Savage acts
f, g ∈ A(Ω) by f %Ω g if a % b for a, b ∈ A such that ϕ(a) = f and ϕ(b) = g. L5.3 makes
this meaningful. (L6.2 ) Axioms A1-6 imply that the Kopylov (2007) axioms all hold.
Consider that % has a Savage representation supported by Ω, K, u and P and let %Ω denote
the seu preference relation over A(Ω) induced by u and P. Say that two experiments
e, f ∈ E are equivalent if K(e) = K(f). Let L(K) denote the set of classes of equivalence.
The class of a experiment e is denoted [e]. The interpretation K induces a mapping still
denoted K : L(K) −→ 2Ω defined for all x ∈ L(K) by K(x) = K(e) if e ∈ x. At last,
L(K) has a natural order ≤ defined as follows: ∀x, y ∈ L(K), x ≤ y if K(x) ⊆ K(y).
The use of ≤ to denote both the latter partial order and subjective implication should not
result in any confusion since L7.1 shows that these two notions coincide.
Lemma 7
(L7.1) ∀e, f ∈ E , K(e) ⊆ K(f) ⇐⇒ ∀a, b ∈ A, e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b)
(L7.2) % necessarily satisfies A1 through A6, B1 through B4 and C1 through C5
(L7.3) L(K) has the structure of a Boolean algebra
(L7.4) K : L(K) −→ L(Ω) is an isomorphism of Boolean algebras
Proof (L7.1 ) If K(e) ⊆ K(f), then, for all a, b ∈ A, acts e(a, b) and e ◦ f(a, b) induce the
same Savage act through ϕ and necessarily e(a, b) ∼ e◦f(a, b). If the latter condition holds
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for all a, b ∈ A, let E = K(e) and F = K(f) so that E∩F = K(e◦f) and fix g, h ∈ A(Ω).
Since ϕ is surjective by construction, let a and b be acts such that g = ϕ(a) and h = ϕ(b).
By assumption, gEh ∼Ω gE∩Fh. Since u is nonconstant, this implies P(E ∩F ) = P(E). By
condition (3) in the definition of a probability, one has E ⊆ F and finally K(e) ⊆ K(f).
(L7.2 ) As a preliminary result, let us show that L(K) is a distributive lattice. For any
x, y ∈ L(K), let x ∧ y = [e ◦ f ], x′ = [e′] and x ∨ y = (x′ ∧ y′)′ where e ∈ x and f ∈ y.
Parts (2) and (3) of the definition of an interpretation make these definitions correct. In
addition, let 0 and 1 denote the classes of n and y respectively. Since K preserves products
and thus meets as well, each x ∧ y is the greatest lower bound of x and y. Since K also
preserves complements, it preserves joins as well and, therefore, each x ∨ y is the lowest
upper bound of x and y. As a result, L(K) is a lattice and, since it is isomorphic, as a
lattice, to the distributive lattice L(Ω), it is distributive itself. To show L7.2, first note
that preferences %Ω necessarily satisfy the condition that appears in L6.1. Then, the
Kopylov axioms are all implied for %Ω and A1-6 directly follow from Kopylov’s theorem
3.1. For B1-7, it is sufficient to note that the acts that are compared in these axioms
induce pairwise the same Savage acts through ϕ. These axioms are therefore satisfied. To
show Axiom C1, let h ∈ [e] ∨ [g] and k ∈ [f ] ∨ [g]. Then, clearly, e ≤ h and f ≤ k. In
addition, using distributivity, [h]∧ [k] = ([e]∨ [g])∧ ([f ]∨ [g]) = ([e]∧ [f ])∨ [g] = [g] so that
h ◦ k ≈ g. To show Axiom C2, assume e ≤ f . Then, by L7.1, K(e) ⊆ K(f) and, therefore,
K(f ′) = K(f)c ⊆ K(e)c = K(e′) so that, again by L7.1, f ′ ≤ e′. (L7.3 ) There only
remains to show that the distributive lattice L(K) is complemented. Since K(n) = ∅ and
K(y) = Ω, K(n) ⊆ K(e) ⊆ K(y), for all e ∈ E , and, therefore, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, for all x ∈ L(K).
Then, 0 and 1 are indeed the lowest and greatest bound in the lattice. Note that 0′ = 1 and,
for all x ∈ L(K), x′′ = x, x∧ 1 = [e◦ y] = [e] = x and x∨ 0 = (x′∧ 0′)′ = (x′∧ 1)′ = x′′ = x
all follow from the definition of an interpretation and end up making L(K) a Boolean
algebra. (L7.4 ) At last, K is bijective by construction and, in fact, a Boolean algebra
isomorphism since it preserves the Boolean operations.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Necessity of the axioms) The necessity of axioms has been proved in
L7.2. (Sufficiency of the axioms) Sufficiency uses Lemma 6. Since preferences %Ω conform
to the Kopylov axioms, it follows from his Theorem 3.1 that there exists a nonconstant
utility function u and a probability measure P over (Ω,L(Ω)) such that f %Ω g ⇐⇒
EPu(f) ≥ EPu(g). To show condition (3) in the definition of a probability measure, let
E,F ⊆ Ω be Savage events such that E ⊆ F and P(F ) = P(E). With this notation,
it is sufficient to show that E = F . Let e, f ∈ E be experiments such that E = K(e)
and F = K(f). Since E ⊆ F , e(a, b) and e ◦ f(a, b) induce the same Savage act through
ϕ and, by L5.3, one has e(a, b) ∼ e ◦ f(a, b), for all a, b ∈ A. On the other hand, fEg
and fFg are equal over an observable event of probability one so that fEg ∼Ω fF g for
all f, g ∈ A(Ω) and, therefore, e(a, b) ∼ f(a, b), for all a, b ∈ A. By A1 and B5, one
has f(a, b) ∼ f ◦ e(a, b), for all a, b ∈ A and, therefore, f ≤ e so that finally e ≈ f and
E = K(e) = K(f) = F . Condition (4) is delivered by Kopylov’s Theorem 3.1. At last, one
has a % b ⇐⇒ ϕ(a) %Ω ϕ(b) ⇐⇒ EPu(ϕ(a)) ≥ EPu(ϕ(b)), which ends the proof for the
sufficiency of axioms. (Uniqueness up to equivalence) Assume first a Savage representation
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supported by Ω, K, u and P. As shown in L7.3, L(K) is a Boolean algebra. Let Ω0 be
the associated Stone space. Consider, for each ω ∈ Ω, the mapping αω : L(K) −→ {0, 1}
defined by αω(x) = 1 iff ω ∈ K(x). The properties of an interpretation make sure that
αω is an element of Ω0. Let us now show that α : Ω −→ Ω0 is a bijective, bimeasurable
and bicontinuous. Consider two states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω 6= ω′. Since Ω is Hausdorff,
there exists an open set E ⊆ Ω such that ω ∈ E and ω′ /∈ E. Since Ω is zero-dimensional,
E is the union of some clopen subsets. As a result, there is a clopen subset F that
contains ω and not ω′. Then, let e be a experiment such that K(e) = F . One has
αω([e]) = 1 and αω′([e]) = 0 so that α is indeed injective. For surjectivity, fix an element
β ∈ Ω0 and consider the set of clopen subsets {K(x) ∈ L(Ω), for all x ∈ L(K) such
that β(x) = 1}. Any finite and nonempty subset of this set set has a nonzero lower
bound. Given that Ω is assumed compact, the intersection of all its elements cannot be
empty. Let ω denote an element in this intersection. If β(x) = 1, then ω ∈ K(x) and
αω(x) = 1. If β(x) = 0, then β(x
′) = 1, αω(x
′) = 1 and αω(x) = 0. Therefore, β = αω.
Let us now show that α is bimeasurable and bicontinuous. Fix a clopen subset E0 of Ω0.
Necessarily, there exists a class x ∈ L(K) such that E0 = {β ∈ Ω0, β(x) = 1}. Then,
α−1(E0) = {ω ∈ Ω, αω(x) = 1} = K(x) is a clopen subset of Ω. In addition, let E
be a clopen subset of Ω. Then, there exists a experiment e such that K(e) = E and,
therefore, a class x ∈ L(K) such that K(x) = E. Then, (α−1)−1(E) = {αω ∈ Ω0, for
all ω ∈ Ω such that αω(x) = 1} = {β ∈ Ω0, β(x) = 1} is a clopen subset of Ω0. Hence
bimeasurability. Zero-dimensionality implies continuity and bicontinuity follows since Ω is
compact and Ω0 is Hausdorff. Assume now two Savage representations supported by Ω1,
K1, u1, P1 and Ω2, K2, u2, P2 As a corollary of L7.1, two different Savage representations
of the same preference relation necessarily induce the same Boolean algebra denoted L.
Let α1 : Ω1 −→ Ω0 and α
2 : Ω2 −→ Ω0 be the homeomorphism obtained as above. Let
ǫ : Ω2 −→ Ω1 be the homeomorphism defined by α
1 ◦ ǫ = α2. For all ω2 ∈ Ω2 and
all x ∈ L, ω2 ∈ K2(x) ⇐⇒ α
2
ω2
(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ α1ǫ(ω2)(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ ǫ(ω2) ∈ K1(x). Finally,
K1(e) = ǫ(K2(e)), for all e ∈ E . Let us now prove that ϕ2(a) = ϕ1(a)◦ǫ by induction on the
order of a. If the order of a is 0, then a is a consequence and ϕ2(a)(ω2) = a = ϕ1(a)(ǫ(ω2)),
∀ω2 ∈ Ω2. Else, let a = e(b, c) with b and c acts of order strictly less than the order of a.
One has ϕ2(a) = ϕ2(b)K2(e)ϕ2(c). By induction, ϕ2(b) = ϕ1(b) ◦ ǫ and ϕ2(c) = ϕ1(c) ◦ ǫ
so that ϕ2(a) = (ϕ1(b) ◦ ǫ)K2(e)(ϕ1(c) ◦ ǫ) = (ϕ1(b)K1(e)ϕ1(c)) ◦ ǫ = ϕ1(a) ◦ ǫ. Finally,
consider f, g ∈ A(Ω) and, since ϕ is surjective, let a, b ∈ A be acts such that ϕ1(a) = f
and ϕ1(b) = g. Then, f %Ω1 g ⇐⇒ ϕ1(a) %Ω1 ϕ1(b) ⇐⇒ a % b ⇐⇒ ϕ2(a) %Ω2 ϕ2(b) ⇐⇒
ϕ1(a) ◦ ǫ %Ω2 ϕ1(b) ◦ ǫ ⇐⇒ f ◦ ǫ %Ω2 g ◦ ǫ. As a result, %Ω1 is seu, not only with respect
to u1 and P1, but also with respect to u2 and the image of P2 through ǫ. To conclude, it
is sufficient to invoke Kopylov’s (2007) theorem 3.1 in the case of a finite algebra, which
provides a uniqueness argument for utility functions and subjective probabilities.
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